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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis investigates the zero-leverage phenomenon and its relationship with investment 
before, during and after the latest financial crisis. The data used in this study contains 
industrial firms from USA. Financial and utility firms are omitted from the sample. The 
whole sample includes 992 firms. Sample period captures the years from 2003 to 2012 and 
is divided into three sub periods: pre crisis, crisis and post crisis. The first period contains 
years 2003-2006, the second 2007-2009 and the third 2010-2013.  
 
Logistic model is used in order to test zero-leverage phenomenon around financial crisis. 
For analysis the traditional firm variables are used. For relationship between zero-leverage 
and investment fixed effects panel estimation with OLS estimator for variable coefficients 
is employed in order to execute empirical tests. This relationship is analysed using Tobin’s 
Q investment model. 
  
Low-leverage phenomenon is increasing in various countries. Some researchers presents 
that this phenomenon is related with IPO waves, shifts in industry compositions, increasing 
asset volatility and declining corporate tax rates. Additionally various scholars declare that 
firms which follow zero-leverage policy are smaller, have higher cash balances, and have 
higher market-to-book ratios and higher pay-out ratios.  
 
Results for this study present that zero-levered firms in USA around financial crisis are 
financially constrained. They pay high taxes and achieve tax deduction from non-debt 
sources. Coefficients from pay-out dummy variable and pay-out ratio identify that there is 
one type of zero-levered firm. However, the significance of pay-out ratio is not consistent 
in various logistic regression models. Additionally, the zero-levered firms are riskier and 
tend to use more equity. And based by previous year’s zero-leverage decision dummy 
variable, these firms are consistent, they maintain their decision to follow zero-leverage 
policies.  
KEYWORDS: zero-leverage, low-leverage, financial crisis, investment.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Purpose of the study, intended contributions and limitations 
 
 
At this moment, various researchers try to answer why firms choose zero-leverage and what 
is its effect on a firm. Strebulaev and Yang (2013) suggest that studies about various factors 
which could affect firm’s propensity to follow zero-leverage policy help to understand 
economic mechanisms of low levered firms. Therefore, it is easier to identify the 
dominating factors. It is important to emphasize, that there is an advantage to use debt, for 
instance tax shield. Additionally, Graham (2000) adds firms could increase their value by 
optimizing on tax benefits of debt. As a result, why there is a tendency for firms to follow 
zero-leverage policies? 
 
One of the motivations of this study is to analyse the zero-leverage phenomenon around 
financial crisis. This is done by checking the relationship between zero-leverage firms and 
explanatory variables, using a logistic regression. The study about zero-leverage 
phenomenon could help to identify if firms choose such policy based on strategic motives 
or if it is simply a consequence of financial problems which firm has faced.  
 
Second purpose of this study is to find association between zero-leverage and firm’s 
investment. This association could help to explain zero-leverage phenomenon which is 
increasing during recent years. This analysis helps to identify if firms follow zero-leverage 
policies based on strategic motives or it is related with financial problems which firm faces. 
 
The main contribution of this study is to investigate if the recent financial crisis has impact 
for the zero-leverage phenomenon in USA. Various researchers try to explain zero-leverage 
phenomenon in USA, but they have not studied if financial crisis has impact for firm’s 
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decision to imply zero-leverage policy. However, this kind of study has already been 
carried out in UK by Dang (2013).  
 
The main limitation of this study is that it will be hard to examine the effect of leverage on 
investment around the crisis. First, investments decreased for both leveraged and non-
leveraged firms during the crisis. It is not about the demand for investments but rather the 
supply. There were not that many investments opportunities.  
 
1.2 Research hypothesis 
 
 
This study investigates the relationship between zero-levered firms and investment around 
the financial crisis. The first hypothesis of this study is that:  
 
H1: The recent global financial crisis has generally affected the firm’s decision to follow 
zero-leverage policy.  
 
Academics presents controversial evidence how various financial crisis affect firm’s capital 
structure or its’ leverage policy. Dang (2013) states that during the periods when economic 
is in recession (low or negative GDP growth rate), firms should use less debt.  The author 
emphasizes that GDP growth rate should have a negative impact for zero-levered firms, 
especially if these firms are financially constrained. The main variable in order to capture 
crisis impact for capital structure is the GDP growth rate. 
 
The last three hypotheses are based by Dang (2013) and Bessler (2013) where they states 
that financial flexibility, financial constraints and underinvestment hypotheses could 
explain zero-leverage phenomenon.  
 
H2: Financial flexibility hypothesis states that firms save cash or internal funds in order to 
save their borrowing strength for future investment possibilities. 
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The financial flexibility hypothesis could be tested by examining how growth opportunities 
and cash holdings affect firm’s zero-leverage policy. DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2007) show 
that firms with many possible growth opportunities save money for instance eschew debt 
and accumulate cash.  Bessler (2013) in his study also describes financial flexible firms 
which have higher level of internal funds; therefore the coefficients of cash holdings should 
be large and significant.  
 
H3: Financial constraint hypothesis states that debt-free policy is the consequence of 
constrained firms being restricted by their lenders.  
 
Dang (2013) predict that constrained firms most of the time are small. Therefore the size 
variable could be used to test financial constraint hypothesis. Bessler et al. (2013) suggest 
that constrained firms should be smaller, riskier, and less profitable.  
 
H4: Underinvestment hypothesis predicts that firms with high growth possibilities avoid 
debt.  
 
This hypothesis is tested by Dang (2013) approach; he states that the more valuable the 
growth options, the higher level of agency cost are. In other words, there should be positive 
association between these variables: growth opportunities and zero-leverage dummy 
variable. Bessler et al. (2013) suggest that zero-leverage firms which face underinvestment 
problems should have high ratios of growth opportunities, high cash holdings and to rely on 
equity issuance.  
 
1.3 Previous studies 
 
 
The choice what capital structure firms choose is based by two components equity and 
debt. Moreover, academics are provided various evidence that debt could increase firm’s 
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value and there is benefit from tax shield (Graham, 2000). Some scholar find that financing 
firm’s projects with equity is also beneficial, for instance no maturity date or no repayment 
obligations.  
 
In real market there are various factors, which affect firm’s capital structure decisions. 
Various academics divided these factors in several groups: external and internal factors. 
Harris and Raviv (1988) summarize the main factors which have impact for firm’s capital 
structure and authors find the relationship between factors and capital structure. The 
leverage increase when fixed assets, or company’s size, or perspective of growth are rising. 
On other hand the leverage decrease when increase the volatility of the company, 
expenditures for advertising, research and development, the threat of bankruptcy, 
profitability and product authenticity. However, the results of the analysis for determining 
the exposure direction and strength, excluded industry factor, are different. This can be 
explained by differences in the choice of research methodology, studied period, data base 
or by choosing the variable factors. 
 
During recent year, the percentage of zero-leverage firms has increased and the most 
interesting fact that profitable companies such as Apple, Yahoo, and Urban Outfitters are 
examples of the phenomenon of zero-leverage. Researchers found out that this increase is 
related with IPO waves, industry composition and increasing asset volatility. (Bessler, 
Drobetz, Haller & Meier 2013; Strebulaev & Yang 2013).  
 
Strebulaev and Yang (2013) state that from 1962 to 2009, on average 10.2 per cent of large 
corporations in United States have zero debt and about 22 per cent have less than 5 per cent 
book leverage ratio. Bessler, Drobetz, Haller and Meier (2013) present more recent data 
and state that in US was 25.07 per cent of zero-leverage firms in 2011. Increasing number 
of firms is obvious and various studies which analyse this phenomenon may lead to the 
answer of zero-leverage phenomenon. 
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Many researchers try to answer why companies choose debt or equity, what the best capital 
structure composition is and how much debt firm should have. The main theories are 
Modigliani and Miller propositions (1958), trade-off theory by Kraus and Litzenberger 
(1973), and pecking order theory by Myers and Majluf (1984). But according to recent 
studies (Bessler, Drobetz, Haller & Meier 2013; Strebulaev & Yang 2013; Dang 2013) 
these traditional theories are not able to explain why companies choose not to have debt in 
their capital. Even though, the pecking order theory could explain zero-leverage 
phenomenon. According this theory, firms are more based on their internal funds and cash.  
 
In addition to these traditional theories about capital structure, there are some academics 
who believe that higher debt ratios add more value for the firms. Graham (2000) reports 
that large and profitable corporation with high cash holdings and low expected distress 
costs could significantly increase their value if they increase the debt level. In practice, 
according to Graham (2000) firms tend to behave opposite, they act more conservative. 
Recently, Korteweg (2010) suggests that firms could increase their value by 5.5%, if they 
increase their debt ratios. He states that these results are more on account of zero leverage 
firms. These findings contradict with traditional theories by Myers (1977) and Modigliani 
and Miller (1958). Where they state that the value of the project or firm does not change if 
it is funded by equity or debt, the only difference is who going to realize the investments’ 
cash flows.  
 
In relationship between zero-leverage policy and investments, firms follow zero-leverage 
policy and want to keep flexibility in order to maintain investment in the future (Bessler, 
Drobetz, Haller & Meier 2013; Devos, Dhillon, Jagannathan & Krishnamurthy 2012; 
Strebulaev & Yang 2013). Minton and Wruck (2001) present that low leveraged firms 
increase their leverage when they come up against profitable investments. 
 
However, some academics believe that not just financial flexibility hypothesis could 
explain zero-leverage phenomenon. Dang (2013) checks financial constraints hypothesis, 
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which state that debt-free policy is the consequence of constrained firms being restricted by 
their lenders.  
 
Additionally, underinvestment hypothesis could explain zero-leverage phenomenon. Dang 
(2013) provides arguments why underinvestment and financial flexibility hypotheses are 
different from the financial constraint hypothesis. The main contrast is that firms follow 
zero-leverage policy for strategic reasons, for further investment opportunities. For 
underinvestment hypothesis Dang (2013) examine ratio of growth opportunities. The same 
applies for financial flexibility hypothesis, however Dang (2013) adds one more variable 
for this hypothesis. Additionally, author tests ratio of cash holdings. 
 
Even though, academics put greater attention to the capital structure and investment 
decisions rather than recent financial crisis and its impact for capital structure and 
investment. However, academic literature suggests that financial crisis have impact for 
capital structure decisions and investment. The main macroeconomic factors which could 
show the financial crisis impact are GDP and inflation. Dang (2013) state that during the 
periods when economic is in recession (low or negative GDP growth rate), firms should use 
less debt. Kim and Wu (1988) in their study find out that inflation enhances the level of 
debt.  
 
1.4 Structure of the study 
 
 
This thesis consists of 6 chapters which investigate and explain topics about latest capital 
structure studies in a consecutive order. The firsts three chapters explains the main purposes 
of this study, summarizes previous research on the capital structure,  low-leverage and 
zero-leverage policies, investment, and introduces the hypotheses to be verified through 
empirical tests. Section 2 exhibits concepts of capital structure theories, particularly Myers 
(1977) view about determents of capital structure. The third section presents traditional 
capital structure theories, such as Modigliani and Miller theory, Trade-off and Pecking 
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order theory of capital structure, and analyses them from zero leverage perspective. 
Additionally in the third section, the previous studies about the relationship between zero-
leverage policy and investment around financial crisis are included. In the section 4, it is 
described the data and its characteristics, additionally this section includes main studies 
which have similar hypotheses with this paper and provides the basis for model 
establishment and the method adopted in the study. In the 5 section, it is described the main 
findings from both univariate analysis and multivariate analysis. Finally, section 6 presents 
a brief summary of the main points treated in the study, conclusions, limitations and 
suggestions for further research.  
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2. INTRODUCTION TO CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
 
 
This section introduces the elemental background related to the underlying theories of the 
capital structure choices and leverage. Additionally, it describes factors which affect capital 
structure.  
 
2.1 The concepts of the capital structure and its choices 
 
 
Companies own assets that are produced by its operations and investment activities. In 
order to generate these processes the company should finance the assets. This could be 
done by acquiring funds from financial markets outside the company or by companies 
owned funds. Therefore, leverage could be described as the amount of borrowed funds that 
have been used to finance firm’s activities. Devos et.al (2012) and Strebulaev and Yang 
(2013) describe leverage as the ratio of the sum of short-term and long-term liabilities to 
total assets.  
 
The company has two types of liabilities debt or equity. Some researchers find out that 
companies also have some liabilities which are created by both of these financial 
instruments (Bodie et al., 2011; Megginson, 1997). When investor owns a company’s 
share, he/she has a control right over the company. Debt must be completely paid for its 
provider. Even though, debt and equity provide funds for the companies, these financial 
instruments are different from each other by payment of profit or priority (Table 1).  
 
Table 1 shows a basic idea of debt and equity as financial instruments. The first advantage 
of debt is that interest is tax deductible this means that it lowers the cost of debt. Second, 
debt-holders are limited to a fixed return, this shows that stockholders do not have to share 
profits. Third, debt holders do not have voting rights. Even though debt provide benefits to 
the company, but higher debt ratios lead to greater risk and higher required interest rates in 
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order to compensate for the additional risk (Bodie et al, 2011). This understanding of 
characteristics brings up a good basis for the present study.  
 
Table 1. Main difference between debt and equity  
Characteristic Debt  Equity 
Security requirements Demand of collateral No security collaterals 
Payment of profit Fixed interest Dividend 
Payment priority Primary priority Residual claimant 
Control allocation No control rights Managerial control rights 
Tax deductibility Tax deductible interests No tax deductions allowed 
Maturity  Predefined maturity No maturity date 
Repayment to investor  Obligated repayment  No repayment obligation 
 
Both debt and equity have advantages and disadvantages, therefore the question arise how 
to choose between debt and equity? What is appropriate capital structure? Various 
academics try to look to these questions and provide some theories.  
 
Myers (1977) provides theoretical framework how firm chooses between debt and equity. 
Author of this study believes that it is cheaper to finance a company with debt instead of 
equity. For instance, if T is a tax rate and firm is able to borrow or lend from investor the 
same amount of funds, F, at the same expected rate of return, r. Then, according to Myers 
(1977) debt financing is equal to: 
 
(1)  (𝐸 − 𝑟𝐹)(1 − 𝑇) = 𝐸(1 − 𝑇) − 𝑟𝐹 + 𝑟𝐹𝑇   
 
and equity financing is:  
 
(2)   𝐸(1 − 𝑇) − 𝑟𝐹 
 
In these equations, the residual earnings of debt financing are greater compare with equity 
financing. The difference between equity and debt financing could be measured by rFT, 
which is called the debt tax shield. From theoretical point of view, firms should be financed 
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effectively with debt, however scholars do not observe in real world economy the firm 
which is fully funded by debt. Myers (1977) suggests that in order to finance positive net 
present value projects firms are not going to have more debt because of uncertainty whether 
or not they will be capable to pay the debt. Therefore, there should be certain level of debt, 
where the cost of uncertainty is greater than the gain of the tax shield.  
 
Myers (1977) provides an example of how firms choose between debt and equity in order 
to invest in project with positive NPV. Consider the situation when the firm has some 
amount of money for investment (I) and the rest amount is borrowed before the situation 
about the future is revealed. Therefore firm should pay the principal and interest, P, and the 
debt matures after the investment procedure. Right now, if shareholders want to receive 
incomes of the project, V(s) must be greater than I+P, because the debt must be paid first. 
The future uncertainties show that firms could not pay P. Therefore the investment should 
be done at this point when V(s) ≥ (I+P). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 1.  Value with debt 
 
When V(s) is lower than I+P, the shareholders are not interested in this project and prefer to 
refuse the ownership of the company. In this case the debt issuers acquire the control of the 
firm. Instead of all equity financing, shareholders are going to invest if sb ≤ s. (Figure 1). 
Dollars in 
State, s 
s, State of the World 
I + P 
I  
V(s) 
I + P 
I 
sa sb 
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After default the debt issuers are controlling the firm and if the debt issuers are still 
planning to continue the project after the shareholders default, the debt issuers invest if V(s) 
≥ I or s ≥ sa. This means that the debt issuers will receive the benefits of the investment is 
sa ≤ s ≤ sb.  
 
According to Myers (1977) the value of the project does not change if it is funded by equity 
or by debt, the only difference is who is going to realize the investments’ cash flows. 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) also told that the value of the firm does not change if it is 
funded by equity or by debt. In general, the lower levels of debt are less costly to the firm 
compare with the debt tax shield, when firms are making investment decisions. Myers 
(1977) adds that debt level also is related to the type of assets in firm’s portfolio, for 
instance growth assets support less debt, because there is still option to invest in the future.  
 
In summary, debt provides some advantages. For instance, interest is tax deductible this 
means that it lowers the cost of debt. Further, debt-holders are limited to a fixed return. 
Finally, debt holders do not have voting rights. Even though debt provide benefits to the 
company, but higher debt ratios lead to greater risk and higher required interest rates in 
order to compensate for the additional risk (Bodie et al, 2011). However, traditional capital 
structure theories say that the value of the firm does not change if it is funded by equity of 
by debt (Modigliani & Miller, 1958; Myers, 1977).  
 
2.1.1 Factors influencing capital structure 
 
Various researchers tried to characterize companies by their choice of funding. For 
instance, the company’s size, investment projects, agency problems have impact for the 
companies’ funding choices.  Table 2, represents the main determinants of capital structure.  
 
In the three of these studies are described a negative relationship with the business risk 
level and the debt. However, Auerbach (1985) and Kim, Soernsen (1986) finds a positive 
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interdependence. In analyses of Titman and Wessels (1988), Mehran (1992) and Homifar, 
Zietz and Benkato (1994) there is no observed significant risk and debt relationship.  
 
Table 2. Determinants of capital structure 
 
P
ro
fi
t 
G
ro
w
th
 
o
p
p
o
rt
u
n
it
ie
s 
S
iz
e 
A
ss
et
 
st
ru
ct
u
re
 
R
is
k
 
E
co
n
o
m
ic
 
si
tu
at
io
n
 
A
g
en
t 
p
ro
b
le
m
s 
T
ax
 s
h
ie
ld
 
In
d
u
st
ry
 
In
so
lv
en
cy
 
Bowen et al. (1982)        X X  
Marsh (1982)   X X X      
Bradley et al. (1984)     X   X X  
Auerbach (1985)  X  X X      
Kim & Sorensen (1986)  X   X      
Titman & Wessels 
(1988) 
X  X      X  
Crutchley & Hansen 
(1989) 
  X  X      
Fischer et al. (1989)   X  X     X 
Mehran (1992)  X     X    
Balakrishnan & Fox 
(1993) 
   X       
Chung (1993)    X X      
Homaifar et al. (1994) X  X   X  X   
Rajan & Zingales (1995) X X X X       
Cassar & Holmes (2003) X X  X       
 
Profitability was analysed just in four studies. Titman and Wessels (1988), Jorgensen and 
Terra (2003) confirms that when profitability grows the company’s debt is decreasing. For 
instance, profitability factor is significant; however, it has a negative impact on the size of 
debt.  
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Studies provide controversial results about company’s development. Auerbach (1985) 
states that when company is growing fast the debt level is also increasing more rapidly. 
Kim and Sorensen (1986) find the opposite relationship. However, Titman and Wessels 
(1988) do not exclude any of dependence. The recent study suggests that the growth has 
significant impact upon small and medium firms financing and capital structure (Cassar & 
Holmes, 2003).  
 
Relationship between existing asset structure and level of the debt is studied by various 
scholars. Most of them find and identify that structure of assets is a significant criteria: 
Marsh (1982), Auerbach (1985), Balakrishnan and Fox (1993), Chung (1993), Cassar & 
Holmes (2003). Even though Titman and Wessels (1988) and Jorgensen and Terra (2003) 
argue that the material value of assets is not a significant factor in the capital structure. 
According to Gatchev et al. (2008) in order to finance fixed assets, firms with high 
asymmetric information choose more short-term debt versus long-term debt, also when 
firms have more agency problems use more equity and less long-term debt or cash. 
 
Company size is defined as an insignificant factor by Mehran (1992) or as a significant 
factor with a positive association with the degree of debt by Crutchley and Hansen (1989), 
and Homaifar et al. (1994). Graham and Harvey (2001) suggest that the size of the firm is 
statistically significant in the practice of corporate finance. The most important difference 
between large and small firms that majority of large firms have a target debt ratio (Graham 
& Harvey, 2001). Most empirical studies which analyse the relationship between debt and 
industry identify that industry is a significant factor for the fluctuations in the debt.  
 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) distinguish four factors which are related with leverage. For 
instance: fixed assets, the size of the company, profitability, market and book value ratio as 
an indicator of growth perspectives. 
 
In general, previous researches have showed that in the market exist certain factors which 
influence the level of leverage in the company’s capital structure. Harris and Raviv (1988) 
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summarize these factors and they find the relationship between factors and capital structure. 
The leverage increase when fixed assets, or company’s size, or perspective of growth are 
rising. On other hand the leverage decrease when increase the volatility of the company, 
expenditures for advertising, research and development, the threat of bankruptcy, 
profitability and product authenticity.  
 
Finally, it can be said that the results of the analysis for determining the exposure direction 
and strength, excluded industry factor, is different. This can be explained by differences in 
the choice of research methodology, studied period, data base or by choosing the variable 
factors. 
 
2.1.2 External investors effect firms’ capital structure 
 
This part provides analysis about external factors, which have impact for the capital 
structure. Financial literature on capital structure considers the issue from the perspective of 
the company, which is facing competition in fully functioning financial markets. Borrowed 
capital and equity are available under acceptable risk. However, sometimes there is an 
opposite situation, where firm’s financial leverage depends on the choice of an investor. 
The total debt ratio in the economy is determined by the total investor’s debt to securities 
(Miller, 1977).  
 
The most influential investors are banks, pension funds and insurance companies. Banks 
usually have more a short-term obligations, and therefore may have a comparative 
advantage for short-term loans. If compare banks to the pensions funds, which have more 
long-term liabilities, pension funds may tend to hold more long-term assets. On top of this 
result, it can be expected that in a country, with a large bank operating sector, firms may 
use more short-term financial instruments. The opposite situation is likely to be in the 
countries where a large number of pension funds and insurance companies are; therefore in 
these countries firms could use more long-term financial instruments.  
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Supply impact analysis increases the endogenous uncertainty that the financial 
intermediaries develop in such ways that meet the financing needs of companies as well as 
investors’ preferences. Already are conducted studies (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 1999; De Jong 
et al., 2008) about the stock and bond market size effect on company’s capital structure 
choice, also about the turnover and assets held by banks impact on capital structure choice. 
Additionally, these variables are also affected by the company’s capital structure choice. 
For instance, in countries where there is high demand for external capital, the stock market 
is more developed.  
 
According to Modigliani and Miller (1958) the company has an optimal capital structure. 
Faulkender and Petersen (2006) complement this theory in their study about the funding 
sources impact for the capital structure. Company reaches its optimal leverage level, when 
it estimates tax advantage, financial expenses, price and incentives for the use of debt 
compared to equity. Empirical studies have sought to clarify a theory of a capital structure, 
using leverages as function of the characteristics of the company. Companies, with the 
higher tax shield from the debt, have lower financial costs and the mistaken pricing of debt 
compared to equity is less common. Therefore is expected that companies will have greater 
leverage. When a company finds that the benefits of debt is positive, then the company’s 
optimal capital structure is adjusted by issuing more debt or by purchasing shares.  
 
The most common assumption is that a company’s financial leverage is the company’s 
demand function. In other words, the supply of capital is perfectly price elastic; cost of 
capital depends on the risk assumed by the company (Faulkender & Petersen, 2006). 
Although most of the empirical studies confirm the existence of variables dependence of 
leverage, some authors state that there are some companies below their optimal leverage. 
Graham (2000) argues that the companies incorrectly assess the opportunities to create a 
higher value by increasing financial leverage and reducing the payment of income tax, 
making an assumption that the other debt costs are constant; the company has a possibility 
to get a loan.  
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In economic literature, banks and private investors are described as relatively reliable and 
transparent in order to identify valuable debtors (Faulkender & Petersen, 2006). Company’s 
source of capital may be linked with the company’s ability to enter the debt markets. Lack 
of transparency in the company (it is difficult to assess its financial situation) or companies, 
which have more flexibility in their investment decisions (with more internal resources, it is 
difficult for lenders to restrict such companies with contracts) are likely to borrow more 
from active lenders. In theory, these companies should be more constrained, because it is 
more difficult for such companies to borrow. When company do not have an access to the 
debt markets, there are limited amount of opportunities for lenders to give them credit. It 
should mean that such company has a lower credit rating. In perfect market, companies 
receiving financing if the project net present value is positive.  
 
Regardless external investors, various studies suggest that the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) is one of the most applied external determinants of capital structure (Bastos et al., 
2009). Market imperfections (information asymmetry and investment distortions) can affect 
the capital structure choices; it could mean that the firms’ decisions partly depend on the 
lenders (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). In order to calculate the financial leverage of the 
company, it is important to assess not only leverage factors (demand) but also external 
factors that allow assessing constraints of the company which wants to increase leverage 
(supply) (Titman & Wessels, 1988).  
 
External investors and macroeconomic factors, as well as internal factors have an impact on 
the capital structure. One of the noticeable lacks of external investors is a limited 
opportunity for companies to choose the desired investor. In this case, freedom of choice 
depends by the investor’s policy and later by the company’s financial need.  
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3. STUDIES ABOUT LOW-LEVERAGE OR ZERO-LEVERAGE 
 
 
This chapter identifies one of the extreme cases of capital structure. Firstly, the foundation 
of low leveraged firm is analysed, the main academic studies about the debt conservatism is 
presented. Further is studied the zero-leverage phenomenon, the extreme case of capital 
structure, when firm does not have a debt in its capital structure. Accordingly, various 
traditional capital structure theories were examined related with zero-leverage 
phenomenon. Third, investment and capital structure relationship is examined. Considering 
that investment could explain why firms tend to eschew debt. Additionally the recent 
financial crisis is studied in relationship with investment and capital structure.   
 
3.1 Debt conservatism and its foundation 
 
 
During recent years increased the popularity of academic literature about debt conservatism 
and zero-leverage phenomenon. It is know from previous chapters that there is a tax 
advantage to issuing debt in comparison to equity. Graham (2000) suggests that large and 
profitable firms with high cash holdings and low expected distress costs could significantly 
increase their value if these firms increase the debt level. In practice, according to Graham 
(2000) firms tend to behave opposite, they act more conservative. Recently, Korteweg 
(2010) suggests that firms could increase their value by 5.5%, if they increase their debt 
ratios. He states that these results are more on account of zero leverage firms.  
 
Minton and Wruck (2001) study the low leverage or financial conservatism phenomenon 
and show that firms which follow low leverage policy are following a pecking order theory. 
These companies have a high movement of funds and substantial cash balances, which 
helps to fund unexpected expenses internally. Additionally, Minton and Wruck (2001) 
present that financial conservatism is more temporary, because 70% of low leverage firms 
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change their financial policies. Moreover, nearly 50% of these firms perform so in a period 
of five years.  
 
According to Minton and Wruck (2001) financial conservatism is not based by specific 
industry. However, they find out that conservative firms tend to have high market-to-book 
ratios, operate constantly in industries although firms are more sensitive to financial 
difficulties. In addition, firms with low leverage policies do not have low tax rates or high 
non-debt tax shields.  
 
DeAngelo and Roll (2015) in their study define what is firm which follows low leverage 
policy, and they suggest that debt-to-assets ratio is close to 0.500. Similarly to Minton and 
Wruck (2001), DeAngelo and Roll (2015) report that firms temporarily holds low leverage 
policies. Moreover, they present that the growth of low leverage firms is related with 
increasing number of young firms during recent years.   
 
Park et al. (2013) study various leverage policies of multinational corporations and 
domestic corporations in USA. They find that leverage levels of multinational corporations 
are not significantly lower compare with domestic corporations, when authors of the study 
control key firm characteristics related to leverage levels. Park et al. (2013) accept the 
conclusion that multinational corporations’ capital structure policies are not significantly 
affected by their greater risk to market insufficiency such as taxes and regulations.  
 
Some researches identify that internal corporate governance have impact for adopting 
conservative debt policy. Iona et al. (2007) state that managerial ownership, board 
composition and ownership concentration are one of the main determinants. For instance, 
authors identify that there is a positive association between conservative policies and 
ownership concentration. Authors in their study find that there is a negative correlation of 
conservative debt policy and the number of shares held by non-executive directors. The last 
determinant, the percentage of non-executive directors in the board, has negative 
relationship with debt conservatism. Additionally, Iona et al. (2007) state that firms which 
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have adopted low leverage policies tend consistently hold larger than target internal funds 
and lower than target leverage ratios in comparison with traditional capital structure 
theories.  
 
Lemmon et al. (2001) study about the main determinants of two extreme debt policies, one 
of them is related with debt conservatism. Authors identify that firm with conservative debt 
policy is larger, more profitable and have constant cash flows in comparison with firm 
which have a high level of debt. As various studies about debt conservatism, authors also 
supports that high level of internal funds is one of the main determinants of debt 
conservatism. Moreover, they state that the level of investment is more sensitive to present 
situation of cash flows. Additionally Lemmon et al. (2001) suggest that firms with 
conservative debt policy are less likely to become acquisition targets.   
 
According to various authors, companies follow low-leverage temporally and they have 
high market-to-book ratios; they operate constantly, even though firms are more sensitive 
to financial problems. In addition, low tax rates or regulations do not explain why firms 
follow low leverage policies. Furthermore, various researchers state that traditional capital 
structure theories are not capable to explain why firms choose to follow conservative debt 
policy. However, some researches identify determinants of firms with conservative debt 
policies. It could be related with corporate government or related with firms’ 
characteristics, for instance high level of internal funds, size and profitability.  
 
3.2 Understanding zero-leverage phenomenon  
 
 
During recent years the percentage of zero-leverage firms has increased and the most 
interesting fact that profitable companies such as Apple, Yahoo, and Urban Outfitters are 
examples of the phenomenon of zero-leverage. Researchers find out that this increase is 
related with IPO waves, industry composition and increasing asset volatility (Bessler, 
Drobetz, Haller & Meier 2013; Strebulaev & Yang 2013). Bessler et al. (2013) add that 
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zero-leverage puzzle is international phenomenon and it is more familiar in countries with 
common law origin and higher creditor protection. This statement is confirmed by Dang 
(2013), he analyses sample of UK firms and author finds that zero-leverage firms are not 
homogeneous.  
 
Strebulaev and Yang (2013) state that from 1962 to 2009, on average 10.2 per cent of large 
corporations in United States have zero debt and about 22 per cent have less than 5 per cent 
book leverage ratio. Bessler, Drobetz, Haller and Meier (2013) present more recent data 
and state that in US was 25.07 per cent of zero-leverage firms in 2011. Increasing number 
of firms is obvious and various studies which analyses this phenomenon may lead to the 
answer of zero-leverage phenomenon.  
 
Strebulaev and Yang (2013) try to explain why firms choose not to have debt in their 
capital. They state that zero-leverage policy is persistent, because firms seek financial 
flexibility. For instance, 30 per cent of zero-leveraged companies, which have been around 
for five years, do not raise any debt in the next four years (Strebulaev & Yang, 2013). 
Authors also find out that a third of zero-leverage firms pay dividends and moreover firms 
effectively restore interest payments to dividends and share repurchases; therefore the total 
pay-out ratio is approximately low across the whole spectrum of leverage. Further, 
Strebulaev and Yang (2013) identify the main characteristics of the firms that follow zero-
leverage policy. These firms have higher market-to-book ratios and greater cash balances, 
are more profitable and successful and pay more dividends and taxes.   
 
One of the explanations of zero-leverage phenomenon is related to the corporate 
governance, since the manager’s choices vary with shareholders. According to Strebulaev 
and Young (2013) if managers own stocks or firms with longer-tenured Chief Executive 
Officer and smaller and more independent boards than firms are more likely to follow low 
leverage policy. Authors add that the findings are more significant for the dividend-paying 
firms. Additionally family owned firms are also more zero-levered (Strebulaev & Young, 
2013).  
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Devos et al. (2012) findings are more controversial compare with Strebulaev and Yang 
(2013), even though both studies investigate zero-leverage phenomenon in USA. As it was 
mentioned before, Strebulaev and Yang (2013) state that certain corporate governance 
characteristics (board size, CEO tenure and family ownership) and managerial elements 
have associations with the firms’ zero-leverage policies. Although, Devos et al. (2012) 
rejected hypothesis that corporate governance features have impact to firm’s low leverage 
policy. For instance, authors believe that firms are not capable to get a debt from the 
market. Therefore, the entrenched managers, internal or external governance are not likely 
to explain why firms follow zero-leverage policies.  
 
Most of the researchers present two types of companies which follow zero-leverage 
concept: constrained and unconstrained companies (Strebulaev & Yang, 2013; Dang, 
2013). Although, Devos et al. (2012) identify the one group of companies and state that 
these companies implement zero-leverage policy because of market frictions. In general, 
low or negative GDP, high interest rates have impact for firm’s decision to borrow in order 
to finance positive net present value projects.  
 
Bessler et al. (2013) analyse the time-series dynamics of leverage and investment 
behaviour. First in their work, Bessler et al. (2013) show the increasing number of firms 
which follow zero-leverage policy. Second, authors are the first ones who observed that 
firms outside United States also implemented zero-leverage policies.  
 
Similarly to Strebulaev and Yang (2013), Bessler et al. (2013) also state that firms which 
implement a zero-leverage policy only for a short period of time seek financial flexibility. 
Authors divided zero-leveraged firms in two groups: constrained and unconstrained firms. 
For instance, as soon as firm leave zero-leverage concept, firm starts to choose higher 
leverage ratios, reduce cash holdings and make higher investments. Authors call such 
companies unconstrained, because firms are waiting for the profitable investment 
opportunities in the future. Other group of the zero-leveraged firms is called constrained, 
because they follow zero-leverage approach in the long term, are more depended on 
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internal funds, and most important for this study that these companies are less flexible to 
make investment decisions.  
 
Dang (2013) also try to answer why firms have zero leverage and he made a significant 
contribution analysing zero-leveraged firms in United Kingdom. Author presents two types 
of firms: dividend payers and non-payers. The non-payers follow zero-leveraged policy 
because of financial constraints; these companies are young, small in size with negative 
profits and low tangibility. The payers are unlevered in order to improve investment 
opportunities. Such firms are more develop and profitable, larger in size and with 
approximately higher dividend pay-out ratios.  
 
It is important to mention that some researchers state that macroeconomic conditions have 
impact for zero leverage (Dang, 2013; Devos et al, 2012). The macroeconomic conditions 
could be described by the GDP growth rate and for firms it is more important the interest 
rate. Low or negative GDP growth rate have association with firms’ zero-leverage policies 
and zero-leverage firms’ choice to issue debt. Although, this association is only significant 
for firms who are less constrained and they are paying dividends. (Dang, 2013).  
 
In general, zero-leverage phenomenon is increasing in various countries. Some researchers 
presents that this phenomenon is related with IPO waves, shifts in industry compositions, 
increasing asset volatility and declining corporate tax rates. Additionally, firms which 
follow zero-leverage policy are smaller, have higher cash balances, and have higher 
market-to-book ratios and higher pay-out ratios. Other researches analyse the corporate 
governance mechanisms and managerial work in order to explain zero-leverage policy. 
 
3.3 Zero-leverage phenomenon according to traditional capital structure 
theories 
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The main goal of the company is to maximize stockholders wealth. Every decision should 
be made in accordance with this subject. Researchers studied how a company should 
choose a capital structure in order to meet the goal of stockholders wealth maximization. 
The main theories which try to answer how capital structure affects company is Modigliani 
and Miller propositions (1958), trade-off theory by Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), and 
pecking order theory by Myers and Majluf (1984). These theories suggest using debt 
because of the tax benefits, although according to Bessler et al. (2013) recent studies still 
uncertain which traditional theory better describes firms’ capital structure.   
 
3.3.1 Modigliani & Miller theorem  
 
If we assume that market is perfect: no transaction cost, no bankruptcy cost, no taxes, all 
agents are rational and have the same information, and the borrowing costs for both firms 
and investors are equivalent, then according to Modigliani and Miller (1958) a firm’s value 
is independent of its financial policy. The structure between debt and equity does not affect 
the firm’s value. In other words, the value of the levered firm is the same as the value of 
unlevered firm. But if we take into an account a corporate tax then according to Modigliani 
and Miller theory (1958) the company has more benefits for instance in terms of lower tax 
payments.  
 
The Modigliani and Miller (1958) compare two different companies, one is unlevered and 
the second one is levered and it is known that the value of these companies is the same. In 
order to explain this statement, suppose that an investor is buying shares of these two 
companies. He could invest in the shares of the levered company, or invest in the shares of 
the unlevered company, but borrow the same sum of money compare to levered company. 
Return on investment in both scenarios would be indistinguishable. It was mentioned 
before, the authors of this theory created assumptions in order that the investor’s cost of 
borrowing is the same as that of the company with debt. When market is inefficient, these 
assumptions do not hold, therefore for a company, with riskier debt, is higher required 
return of equity. Later, Modigliani and Miller (1963) add to their theory a second 
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proposition, which states that required return to stockholders rises with leverage. For 
instance, leveraged equity has greater risk and it should have a greater expected return in 
order to compensate such risk. In general Modigliani and Miller theory shows that firm’s 
value will not change by repacking the firm’s securities.  
 
As we know, debt lowers tax payments, but at the same time firm is obligated to pay 
interest and principal payments. If firm does not execute these obligations, than firm may 
face some financial difficulties. The main drawback in Modigliani and Miller (1958) theory 
is that it has many assumptions that do not help to predict firms’ behaviour in the real life. 
According to Aivazian, Ge, and Qiu (2005) Modigliani and Miller theory tries to show how 
finance influence real investment decisions, but authors of this theory assume that market is 
perfect and that could create underinvestment or overinvestment motivation.  
 
Although, Modigliani and Miller theory is difficult to apply to real market situation, it is 
useful to apply the theorem to find the determinants of optimal capital structure. Even 
though in practice, the theory suggests to use financial leverage and it could have been used 
to increase financial activities. As a result is an increased complexity, and uncertainty in 
financial activities and higher risk. For instance, during resent global financial crisis a lot of 
highly leveraged banks collapse, because of enormous leverage ratios.  
 
3.3.2 Trade-off theory of capital structure  
 
The closer look to reality could be expressed by the trade-off theory, because it takes into 
an account bankruptcy costs. Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) find out that there is an 
advantage for firms to have more debt until the optimal capital structure is reached. For 
instance, the benefit of having debt is tax advantages. Even though, several researchers 
suggest that debt could have harm for the company compared with the equity funding 
(Megginson, 1997). Authors suggest that a firm’s capital structure involves adjustment 
between the tax benefits of debt and the bankruptcy cost (Kraus, Litzenberger 1973). This 
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cost contributes to lower company’s value. Degryse, de Goeij and Kappert (2012) state that 
increase in leverage level have impact on cost of debt.  
 
It was mentioned before, that according to trade-off theory one of the advantage of being in 
debt is tax advantage. Various researchers (Kraus & Litzenberger, 1973; DeAngelo & 
Masulis, 1980) suggest that firms prefer to finance their activities with debt rather with 
equity. DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) present that companies instead of debt tax shield 
could use non-debt tax shield. It could be used as depreciation in order to lower the 
corporate taxes. De Jong (2002) observe that the non-debt tax shield have an impact for the 
leverage of Dutch listed firms. Various studies about the association between non-debt tax 
shield and leverage could help to answer why more firms follow zero-leverage or low-
leverage policy.  
 
3.3.3 Pecking order theory of capital structure 
 
According to Myers and Majluf (1984) the pecking order theory provides two rules: use 
internal financing and issue the safest securities first. The first rule simplifies the decisions 
in order to choose between the debt and equity. Though, not always is enough to use 
internal fund to cover the financial shortage. Therefore, the firm should use external funds. 
The second rule suggests choosing corporate debt instead of equity, because it has 
relatively little risk. However, sometimes the debt could not cover all financial deficits, 
then firm should consider about riskier financing, for instance new equity issuing.  
 
Various researchers have controversy results, one of them supports the pecking order 
theory (Shyam-Sunder & Myers, 1999; De Jong, Verbeek & Verwijmeren, 2012; De Haan 
& Hinloopen, 2003; Brounen, de Jong & Koedijk, 2006) and other ones disapprove it 
(Frank & Goyal, 2008). However, the pecking order theory is more practical in making 
financial decisions. It is known that the announcement of equity issues have a negative 
impact on stock prices (Lucas & McDonald, 1990). Though, riskless securities for instance 
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internal cash flow do not influence stock prices changes. Therefore the investment projects 
first would be financed by internal funds.  
 
In summary, trade-off and pecking order theories could be better adapted to the real world.  
If we compare pecking order theory and trade-off theory, according to Myers and Majluf 
(1984) that it is not necessary for companies to have a target amount of leverage. But Kraus 
and Litzenberger (1973) believe that each firm balance between the benefits of debt with 
the cost of debt until firms have an optimal amount of leverage. Both capital structure 
theories suggest the use of debt because of the tax shield. Thought, these theories are not 
able to explain why so many firms across countries follow a zero-leverage policy (Bessler, 
Drobetz, Haller & Meier 2013; Devos, Dhillon, Jagannathan & Krishnamurthy 2012; 
Strebulaev & Yang 2013). Even though, Jahanzeb et al. (2013) state that profitable firms 
would presumably use internal funds and therefore the level of debt ratio would be lower. 
Moreover, authors suggest that according to the trade-off theory there is a positive 
association between leverage and profitability. For instance, more profitable firms would 
finance their investments with equity or debt, because of the tax benefits.  
 
3.4 The link between zero-leverage and investment  
 
 
It is already known that firms are following low leverage or zero leverage financial policies 
just for a short period of time. Therefore it is relevant to study zero-leverage policies as a 
component of firms’ temporal investment decisions. Dang’s (2013) results suggest that 
zero-leverage policies could have associations with corporate investment and performance. 
 
Additionally in the previous chapters is discussed that traditional capital structure theories 
could not explain zero-leverage phenomenon. However, some researches find associations 
with pecking order theory and its relationship with low-leverage and investment. Other 
researcher results show that capital structure choice and its relationship with investment 
could be explained by trade-off theory.  
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Pecking order theory could explain zero-leverage phenomenon and its association with 
investment. According to Myers and Majluf (1984) firms prefer to use securities which are 
less risky. For instance, retained earnings will be more preferred compared to equity. Dang 
(2013) assumes that firms with large cash flows do need to raise debt, these companies 
could use retained earnings to finance new investment opportunities. Therefore the cash 
flow variable could help to capture the predictions of the pecking order theory.  
 
Duddley (2012) study’s results about capital structure and large investment support trade-
off theory. Author states that firms tend to move to their target capital structure related to 
firms’ investment. Additionally, Duddley (2002) states that firms tend to choose first 
equity, then debt during the financing period of their investment. Author divided 
investment project is several periods and he finds out that during the first stage of the 
project the target leverage ratios are low. This shows that in the beginning of investment 
firms tend to choose more equity compare with debt.  
 
Marchica and Mura (2010) support idea that if debt conservatism is focused in order to 
keep financial flexibility, then it could increase investment capability. Also, in their study 
authors present that higher capital expenditures and higher abnormal investments are 
related with firms’ period of low leverage. Marchica and Mura (2010) complete the long-
run performance tests, which shows that financially flexible firms tend to invest more and 
qualitatively.  
 
Furthermore, De Jong et al. (2012) study firms in USA about their future investments. They 
find out that firms which have high unused debt capability and are more financial flexible, 
they tend to establish higher future investment projects. More importantly, De Jong et al. 
(2012) state that financial flexibility allows firms to weaken investment distortions during 
uncertain dimes.  
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Dang (2013) presents that some firms are facing financial problems, as a result it is 
demanding to obtain sufficient external financing to fund investment projects. These 
problems could arise by asymmetric information (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981) or maybe 
companies are too risky to get a bank loan (Bolton & Feixas, 2000).  
 
The relationship between zero-leverage and investment could be studied differently. For 
instance, what benefits are from investing in low-levered firms? Muradoglu and Sivaprasad 
(2012) study this problem and identify that investment projects based on low-leverage firms 
can create abnormal earnings of 4.43% per year. Additionally, authors identify that 
earnings could be higher by 11.75% if investors invest simultaneously to firms with low-
market-to-book-ratio.  
 
According to various researchers, firms, which follow zero-leverage policy, want to keep 
flexibility in order to maintain investment in the future (Bessler, Drobetz, Haller & Meier, 
2013; Devos, Dhillon, Jagannathan & Krishnamurthy, 2012; Strebulaev & Yang, 2013). 
Minton and Wruck (2001) present that low leveraged firms increase their leverage when 
they come up against profitable investments. One of the hypotheses is that firms follow 
zero-leverage policy in order to build financial flexibility. In contrast, the financial 
constrain hypothesis shows that firms face financial problems and therefore obtain zero-
leverage policy.  
 
3.5 Financial crisis impact for firms’ capital structure and investment 
 
 
Company’s financial policy was affected by the credit contraction of the financial crisis, but 
the greater impact was from future uncertainty and lower growth opportunities. Since the 
financial crisis began (in 2007, third quarter) to the peak (in 2009, first quarter) companies 
do not indicate any change regarding the systemic credit contraction. Instead of reducing 
the amount of cash available, companies significantly increased its cash levels (17.8 per 
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cent increase in investment-grade companies) after the collapse of Lehman Brothers 
(Kahle, Stulz, 2010).  
 
Mokhova and Zinecker (2014) studies’ results show that macroeconomic factors have 
impact for firm’s decision making regarding its’ capital structure. Authors divided 
macroeconomic factors into two groups: monetary factors and fiscal factors. Monetary 
factors are presented as inflation rate, long-term and short-term interest rates. Fiscal factors 
- for instance, tax rates and government expenditure. However, the most important 
determinants of capital structure are GDP and inflation rate (Mokhova & Zinecker, 2014).  
 
There is a study about the effect of inflation on capital structure by Kim and Wu (1988). 
They in study present controversial view about inflation impact on capital structure. First, 
they present idea that during high inflation times firms tend to use more debt, because the 
real cost of debt decrease. Further, they emphasize that during inflationary periods net 
return on stocks is higher in comparison with bonds. This leads to situation when investors 
will sell bonds and buy more stocks, therefore the accumulated debt ratio tend to decline. 
However, Kim and Wu (1988) find that inflation enhances the level of debt. This result is 
found by linked effects of inflation and depreciation on the relative yields of securities.  
 
Some academics advise that financial crisis impact could vary beyond firms with various 
financial problems (Gertler & Gilchrist, 1993). Authors identify two groups of firms 
constrained and unconstrained. First group of firms are riskier and earn higher expected 
returns, second group of firms are opposite and they can borrow a larger amount of debt. 
Therefore, when the unconstrained firms face the economic or financial shocks, it is easier 
for these firms to recover or to reduce the impact of shocks. The consequences for 
constrained firms are more severe, these firms have limitations for borrowing. Therefore 
the economic shock could affect constrained firms decision to follow a more conservative 
debt policy.  
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Other researchers find that financial crisis has impact for firms’ capital structure in UK, 
France and Germany (Iqbal & Kume, 2014). They analyse how leverage ratios change 
through financial crisis. Leverage ratios rise during pre-crisis period until 2008 and 2009 
years and after this period leverage ratios decline until 2011. Some researchers present a 
controversial view from not such recent studies. For instance, Korajczyk et al. (1990) and 
Choe et al. (1993) state that during periods of economic growth firms tend to finance their 
projects by equity in comparison with debt. According these authors, the leverage ratios 
should be lower during expansionary phases. 
  
From investment and financial crisis relations point of view, is not so much research done. 
Bancel and Mittoo (2011) study what impact financial crisis has for firm’s financial 
flexibility in France? The most important result from their study is that firms with high 
financial flexibility are affected less by recent financial crisis. Additionally, they indicate 
financial flexible firms’ characteristics such as low leverage, high cash ratios. Bancel and 
Mittoo (2011) conclude that financial flexibility has a great impact for firms’ capital 
structure decisions.  
 
A similar study is made about Asian firms by Ayaydin et al. (2014). However, they analyse 
two separate crises, the Asian crisis and recent financial crisis. They find that firms sustain 
financial flexibility through conservative leverage policies and by high cash balances. From 
the perspective of investment, financial flexibility is one of most important element 
(Ayaydin et al., 2014). Firms that are financial flexible before the crisis tend to have more 
opportunities to invest, investment is based on internal funds, and financial flexible firms 
tend to perform better during the crisis.   
 
In general, prior literature suggests that financial crisis have impact for capital structure 
decisions and investment. The main macroeconomic factors which could show the financial 
crisis impact are GDP and inflation.  
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4. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
The current section introduces in detail the characteristics of the sample and data utilized 
for the zero-leverage capital structure and its relationship with investment. The features of 
the data sample are revised, such as sample period, periodicity of the observations, the 
focused market and source from where it was obtained, are all described in the current 
section. Second part of this chapter is aimed to highlight how the main hypothesis may be 
tested. In order to make more comprehensive and accurate hypothesis test it is necessary to 
analyse previous empirical studies which examine these hypotheses. Result from this 
analysis it is accessible to identify the main variables and models.  
  
4.1 Data description 
 
 
The data is collected by annual balance sheet and market data of exchange-listed firms in 
USA from the Worldscope database over the period from 2003 to 2013. For this study data 
is used from the NASDAQ stock market index. It is one of the largest exchanges in the 
USA and world by market capitalization and trading volume. Addition, the most common 
NASDAQ traded firms are in technology sector.   
 
All variables are denominated in US dollars. Sample contains just all active and inactive 
traded industrial firms. All financial companies, utilities, and non-publicly traded firms and 
subsidiaries are excluded from the sample. It is very important that the observations should 
have all available balance-sheet data. Otherwise, firms are excluded from the study. 
Moreover, firm-year observations with missing information on total assets, total debt, or 
market value are omitted from data sample. Also firms which do not have information 
about industrial sector or firms with non-consolidated balance sheet are excluded. 
Additionally, for these variables: preferred stock – total, deferred taxes, research and 
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development, missing observations are replaced by zero. Final panel data set includes 992 
industrial firms with a total 10912 firm year observations. 
 
The information about USA macroeconomic variables is taken from World DataBank. The 
period is from 2003 to 2013. The most important variable which could show financial crisis 
is GDP.  
 
4.2 Methodology of previous empirical studies about zero leverage and 
investment 
 
 
4.2.1 Zero-leverage phenomenon 
 
The main studies about zero-leverage policy are written by Bessler, Drobetz Haller & 
Meier (2013); Dang (2013); Strebulaev & Yang (2013).  Table 3 provides an overview of 
variables from the main studies about zero-leverage phenomenon.  
 
Following Strebulaev and Yang (2013) and Bessler et al. (2013) book leverage is defined as 
the ratio of the sum of short-term and long-term liabilities to total assets. Zero leverage 
observations are presented if theirs outstanding amount of book leverage is equal to zero in 
a given years. Many researches in the models used a binary variable taking the value 1 if 
the firm has zero leverage in a given year and 0 otherwise (Bessler, Drobetz, Haller & 
Meier 2013; Devos, Dhillon, Jagannathan & Krishnamurthy 2012; Strebulaev & Yang 
2013; Dang 2013).  
 
Bessler et al. (2013) present various hypothesis related with zero-leverage phenomenon. 
However, one of the main hypotheses checks the tendency that individual stock returns 
have become more volatile within a certain period. Authors expect that increased business 
risk could explain the tendency why firms tend to be debt-free. In order to test this 
hypothesis they used approach by Fama and French (2001) and Denis and Osobov (2008). 
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This includes two steps; first, Bessler et al. (2013) run annual logistic regressions where 
they use data of full sample. The dependent variable is a zero-leverage dummy variable and 
explanatory variables are profitability, market-to-book ratio, size and tangibility. 
Regression includes fixed effects for countries and industries in order to avoid an omitted 
variables problem. In the second step, Bessler et al. (2013) estimate the probability for each 
firm to retain zero-leverage policy.  
 
Table 3. Definition of variables in different studies about zero-leverage phenomenon 
Variable Definition Authors 
Size Natural logarithm of total book assets. Bessler, Drobetz Haller & Meier (2013); 
Dang (2013); Strebulaev & Yang (2013).  
Market-to-
book  
Market-to-book ratio  Bessler, Drobetz Haller & Meier (2013); 
Dang (2013); Strebulaev & Yang (2013). 
Tangibility Ratio of fixed assets to book assets. Bessler, Drobetz Haller & Meier (2013); 
Dang (2013); Strebulaev & Yang (2013). 
Profitability Ratio of operating income before depreciation to book 
assets. 
Bessler, Drobetz Haller & Meier (2013); 
Strebulaev & Yang (2013). 
Abnormal 
earnings 
Ratio of difference between the income before 
extraordinary items for time t and t-1 to the market 
value of equity.  
Bessler, Drobetz Haller & Meier (2013). 
Retained 
earnings 
Ratio of retained earnings to book assets Bessler, Drobetz Haller & Meier (2013). 
Asset growth Ratio of assets in event year t minus assets in year t-1 
divided by assets in t-1. 
Bessler, Drobetz Haller & Meier (2013). 
Capital 
expenditure/ 
Investment 
Ratio of capital expenditures to books assets.  Bessler, Drobetz Haller & Meier (2013); 
Strebulaev & Yang (2013). 
R&D Ratio of research and development expenses to book 
assets.  
Bessler, Drobetz Haller & Meier (2013); 
Strebulaev & Yang (2013). 
Payout 
dummy 
Dummy variable that takes value of 1 if a firm has a 
payout ratio greater than zero in a given year (and 0 
otherwise).  
Bessler, Drobetz Haller & Meier (2013). 
Payout ratio Ratio of the sum of cash dividends and share 
repurchases to book assets. 
Bessler, Drobetz Haller & Meier (2013); 
Dang (2013); Strebulaev & Yang (2013). 
Equity 
issuance 
Ratio of total equity issuances to book assets. Bessler, Drobetz Haller & Meier (2013); 
Taxes   Ratio of income taxes paid to total book assets. Bessler, Drobetz Haller & Meier (2013); 
Dang (2013). 
Non-debt tax 
shield 
Ratio of depreciation to book assets.  Bessler, Drobetz Haller & Meier (2013); 
Dang (2013). 
Cash holdings Ratio of cash holdings to book assets.  Bessler, Drobetz Haller & Meier (2013); 
Dang (2013). 
Asset risk Unlevered annualized volatility of logarithmic monthly 
stock returns (rt). 
Bessler, Drobetz Haller & Meier (2013). 
Debt capacity Dummy variable for estimated debt capacity of a firm 
in a given year.  
Bessler, Drobetz Haller & Meier (2013). 
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Earnings 
volatility 
The absolute value of the difference between the 
annual % change in net income and the (time-series) 
average of this change. 
Dang (2013); Strebulaev & Yang (2013). 
Z-score Predicting the bankruptcy of firm. Dang (2013).  
Cash flow 
 
Net income used to calculate basic Earnings Per Share 
plus depreciation, all divided by total assets.  
Dang (2013). 
Growth 
opportunities 
The firm’s market value (the market value of equity 
plus the book value of debt) divided by total assets. 
Dang (2013). 
Abnormal 
Cap. Ex. 
Abnormal capital expenditure by Titman, Wei and Xie 
(2004).  
Strebulaev & Yang (2013). 
Asset Sale Ratio of assets sales to book assets.  Strebulaev & Yang (2013). 
Operating 
Leases 
Sum of current rental payment and the discounted 
present value of future rental commitments (up to five 
years). 
Strebulaev & Yang (2013). 
 
The second most important hypothesis states that proxy variables for asymmetric 
information are positively associated with tendency to keep a zero-leverage policy. Bessler 
et al. (2013) hypothesize that firm-specific variables could help to explain the increasing 
tendency of zero-leverage policy. First, tax arrangement could explain capital structure 
choices (De Jong et al., 2008; Fan et al., 2012). For instance, firms which pay high taxes 
should have low leverage or even zero-leverage. Second, according to pecking order theory 
more profitable firms which do not have debt should rely more on internal funds.  
 
Third, according to Myers (1977) firms who follow low leverage policy reduce the agency 
costs of debt, for instance underinvestment. Hackbarth and Mauer (2012) present results 
that firms will have lower leverage in cases where firms confront agency conflict over the 
timing of future investments and over the amount of additional debt in order to finance 
future investments. Therefore, Bessler et al. (2013) suggest that firms will have lower level 
of debt in order to reduce the underinvestment problem, then firms should have high 
growth options, high cash holdings and should depend on new equity financing to maintain 
firms growth options. Additional to Barclay et al. (1995) findings, firms with more assure 
debt have higher abnormal earnings. Accordingly, the firms with lower debt should present 
low abnormal earnings.  
 
For the second hypothesis, Bessler et al. (2013) use the logistic regression model. The 
dependent variable is a dummy variable of zero debt. Additionally all explanatory variables 
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in the study are lagged by one year. Authors use year dummy variables in their study, 
therefore their use Wald-test which checks the hypothesis that all year dummy coefficients 
are simultaneously equal to zero.  
 
Additionally, Bessler et al. (2013) analyse supply-side and demand-side effects. For this 
study is concentrated more on demand side, especially financial flexibility. This is 
presented in the next chapter, zero-leverage phenomenon and investment.  
 
In next article Dang (2013) uses two hypotheses: underinvestment and financial flexibility. 
First one predicts that firms with high growth possibilities should avoid debt. Second, firms 
save cash or internal funds in order to save their borrowing strength for future investment 
possibilities. Both these hypotheses predict that firms follow zero-leverage policy just 
because they want to avoid investment bias.  
 
Additionally Dang (2013) checks financial constraints hypothesis, which state that debt-
free policy is the consequence of constrained firms being restricted by their lenders. The 
main variables are firm size and age, which could describe that firms are constrained.  
 
For the underinvestment and financial flexibility hypotheses Dang (2013) provides 
arguments why it is different from the financial constraint hypothesis. The main contrast is 
that firms follow zero-leverage policy for strategic reasons, for further investment 
opportunities. For underinvestment hypothesis Dang (2013) examine ratio of growth 
opportunities. The same applies for financial flexibility hypothesis, however Dang (2013) 
adds one more variable for this hypothesis. Additionally, author tests ratio of cash holdings.  
 
Dang (2013) in his article examines how macroeconomic conditions could impact firms 
financial decision to be debt-free. He relates macroeconomic conditions with constrained 
hypothesis, that firms are more sensitive to asymmetric information (for instance, credit 
market imperfections). Dang (2013) uses GDP growth rate and predict that during the 
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periods when economic is in recession (low or negative GDP growth rate), firms should use 
less debt, and opposite otherwise.   
 
In order to check these hypotheses Dang (2013) performs a logistic regression analysis, the 
model is presented below: 
 
(3) Pr{𝑍𝐿 = 1|𝑿} =
1
1+𝑒−(𝛼+𝑋𝛽)
, 
 
where 𝑍𝐿 is a dummy variable of leverage (1 if the firms has zero leverage in a given year, 
and 0 otherwise, 𝑿 is a vector which represents the firm level and macroeconomic 
variables, 𝛽 is vector of coefficients and 𝛼 is a constant. The main firm-specific variables 
are presented in the Table 3.  
 
Strebulaev and Yang (2013) study that corporate governance has impact for low debt 
levels. They predict that firms follow zero leverage because managers have contrasting 
preferences compare with shareholders. Also, Strebulaev and Yang (2013) predicts that 
family owned firms tend to follow low debt policies.  
 
4.2.2 Zero-leverage relationship with investment  
 
Various authors argue that financial flexibility, financial constraints and underinvestment 
hypotheses could explain zero-leverage phenomenon. This part analyses how academics 
have tested these hypotheses related with zero-leverage phenomenon and investment.  
 
Bessler et al. (2013) test financial flexibility hypothesis, which states that firms tend to 
follow zero-leverage policy in order to prepare for future investment opportunities. They 
divide these analyses into two parts. First, is a time-series analysis of leverage and 
investment behaviour, where it is used these variables: cash holdings, capital expenditure 
and the change of property, plant and equipment. This analysis is based by DeAngelo and 
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Roll (2012). In order to create this time-series analysis and capture the time-series 
characteristics it is necessary to have the data longer than 15 years. The IPO firms are 
mostly excluded from the data, it is important to mention that growth of the IPO firms is 
one of possible explanations of zero-leverage phenomenon.  
 
Second analysis, is based by dynamic panel framework and (3) equation.  
 
(4) 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 ∗ 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑍𝐿𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽4 ∗ (𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝑍𝐿𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡) + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
where 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡 is a capital expenditures; 𝑄𝑖𝑡 is the value of Tobin’s Q (calculated as the 
ratio of market value to book value of assets); 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑡−1the one period lagged cash 
flow; and 𝑍𝐿 − 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 is a zero-leverage duration dummy variable. 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑡−1 −
𝑍𝐿𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡  denotes an interaction term with cash flow that test if firms with a shorter 
zero-leverage duration are more flexible, for instance improving from a lower investment-
cash flow sensitivity and thus an increased investment capability. Finally, 𝛾𝑖 denotes an 
entity fixed effect; 𝛾𝑡a time-specific effect and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 a disturbance term (serially uncorrelated 
with mean zero).  
 
Dang (2013) tests financial constraints, underinvestment and financial flexibility 
hypotheses using Tobin’s Q model of investment:  
 
(5) 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒/𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑍𝐿 ∗ 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑍𝐿 + 𝛽𝐿 ∗
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐿 + 𝛾𝑍𝐿 ∗ 𝑄𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑍𝐿 +  𝛾𝐿 ∗ 𝑄𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐿 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, 
 
where 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒/𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡+1 is a capital expenditures divided by total 
assets, 𝐷𝑍𝐿 and 𝐷𝐿 are dummy variables of zero leverage and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is an error term. The cash 
flow ratio shows how much firm is dependent on internal funds and it is Earnings per Share 
plus depreciation, all divided by total assets. Dang (2013) states this ratio can be used in 
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order to test financial flexibility hypothesis. Variable 𝑄𝑖,𝑡 presents the Tobin’s Q ratio, 
which explains financial flexibility, financial constraint and underinvestment hypotheses. 
Tobin’s Q is ratio of market to book assets.  
 
Aivazian, Ge, and Qiu (2005) state that leverage has significantly negative impact on 
investment and that negative shock is stronger for firms with low growth opportunities. The 
same negative association is observed by Lang, Ofek, and Stulz (1996). If we take a look at 
the Dang (2013), he identifies two types of firms which choose zero-leverage, first group 
has financial constraints. We can assume that if firm has financial constraints and low 
growth opportunities, the choice to have more debt will have negative impact on 
investment.   
 
Several researchers who try to explain zero-leverage puzzle suggest that for further studies 
it is necessary to take into an account macroeconomic conditions, also different motivation 
why firms choose zero leverage (Dang 2013; Strebulaev & Yang 2013). The models which 
have been introduced before do not take into an account macroeconomic conditions. Also 
Strebulaev and Yang (2013) suggest that for further research it is more useful to investigate 
the relationships between leverage and investment process (e.g., front-loaded versus back-
loaded). Maybe this relationship can influence the levels, timing, and persistence of 
corporate financial policy.  
 
4.3 Approach and model 
 
 
The empirical analysis in this thesis is divided into two parts univariate analysis and 
multivariate analysis. Additionally, the multivariate analysis presents the zero-leverage 
phenomenon analysis around financial crisis and zero-leverage relationship with investment 
around financial crisis.  
 
47 
 
In univariate analysis each different variable and sample are explored. First is presented the 
distribution of zero-levered and levered firms in four samples: whole sample, sample before 
crisis, sample during the crisis and sample after crisis. Secondly, the descriptive analysis of 
whole sample is done, which help to summarize the sample. Further, the correlation matrix 
of the main variables is presented. The analysis of variables’ correlation could help to 
identify a predictive relationship. Finally the difference of means test is done.  
 
The multivariate study analyses the zero-leverage phenomena and its relationship with 
investment around financial crisis. In this part four main hypotheses are tested. First one is 
related with financial crisis impact for capital structure, the last ones try to explain zero-
leverage phenomenon. These hypotheses are financial constrain, financial flexibility and 
underinvestment.  The study is based by Bessler et al. (2013) and Dang (2013). First is 
presented the logistic regression and later is estimated a linear Tobin’s Q investment model.  
 
The logistic regression is binary where a dependent variable could have only two possible 
types, in this case 0 or 1. In order to check why firms keep following the zero-leverage 
policy and how it is changed around financial crisis the proxy variables is selected from 
Bessler et al. (2013) study. Idea to use the GDP ratio and previous year zero-leverage 
dummy variable is based by Dang (2013). According the authors, these proxy variables are 
positively associated with tendency to keep zero-leverage policy.  
 
Below in the Table 4 is presented a list of explanatory variables and how they are 
measured. The dependent variable is a binary variable taking the value 1 if the firm has 
zero leverage in a given year and 0 otherwise. 
 
Table 4. Variables and calculations  
Variables Definitions 
Book-leverage Ratio of long- and short-term debt to total book assets. 
Size Natural logarithm of total book assets. 
Market-to-book  Market-to-book ratio.  
Tangibility Ratio of fixed assets to book assets. 
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Profitability Ratio of operating income before depreciation to book assets. 
Abnormal 
earnings 
Ratio of difference between the income before extraordinary items for 
time t and t – 1 to the market value of equity.  
Retained earnings Ratio of retained earnings to book assets. 
Asset growth Ratio of assets in event year t minus assets in year t – 1 divided by 
assets in t – 1. 
Capital 
expenditure/ 
Investment 
Ratio of capital expenditures to books assets.  
∆ Property, plant 
and equipment 
Ratio of difference between the net property plant and equipment for 
time t and t – 1 to book assets.   
R&D Ratio of research and development expenses to book assets.  
Payout dummy Dummy variable that takes value of 1 if a firm has a payout ratio 
greater than zero in a given year (and 0 otherwise).  
Payout ratio Ratio of the sum of cash dividends and share repurchases to book 
assets. 
Equity issuance Ratio of total equity issuances to book assets. 
Taxes   Ratio of income taxes paid to total book assets. 
Non-debt tax 
shield 
Ratio of depreciation to book assets.  
Cash holdings Ratio of cash holdings to book assets.  
Asset risk Unlevered annualized volatility of logarithmic monthly stock return. 
GDP GDP growth rate. 
Previous ZL 
decision 
One year lagged zero-leverage dummy variable. 
 
Additionally to these variables listed in the Table 4, the time dummy variables are added. 
Sample period captures the years from 2003 to 2012 and is divided into three sub periods: 
pre crisis, crisis and post crisis. The first period contains years 2003-2006, the second 2007-
2009 and the third 2010-2013. The time dummy variables are included in the analysis in 
order to present the crisis impact for the zero-leverage phenomenon.  
 
According to Bessler et al. (2013) first in the logistic model the traditional capital structure 
variables are analysed. This includes such variables: size, market-to-book, tangibility, and 
profitability. Later, the expended logistic model is tested. Bessler et al. (2013) emphasize 
that these factors could explain zero-leverage phenomenon: high taxes payments, profitable 
firms rely on internal funds, high growth options and cash holdings; moreover firms tend to 
rely on equity financing. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year.  
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Additionally, all these variables are presented in the above table and they are analysed 
based on traditional capital structure theories. First theory is pecking order theory, which 
indicates that firms rely more on internal funds, when they have low debt level. Therefore 
the profitability and retained earnings ratio should be high. Next theory is trade-off theory, 
where firms should be small, have low tangibility and high growth opportunities. The 
growth opportunities in this study are presented as a combination of market-to-book ratio 
and research and development ratio.  
 
For analysis of zero-leverage relationship with investment the main four hypotheses are 
tested using (5) equation. The fifth equation represents a linear Tobin’s Q investment 
model. This regression examines what affect zero-leverage policy has for firm’s future 
investment.  
 
The interpretation of Tobin’s Q coefficients in (5) equation could be varied. First in 
relationship with financial flexibility and underinvestment hypotheses firms follow zero 
leverage policy to reduce the investment bias, than firms’ capability to invest in future 
should increase. The results should be strong for both groups’ levered and zero-levered 
firms. In order to accept the constrained hypothesis the zero-levered firms should take 
fewer growth opportunities in comparison with firms which obtain zero-leverage policy in 
order to reduce investment bias.  
 
Cash flow ratio in (5) equation shows the cash flow sensitivity to investment. This ratio 
could help to identify how much firm is dependent on internal funds. Dang (2013) suggest 
that this coefficient could be used to examine the financial flexibility hypothesis. Author 
state that if firms avoid debt just for the reason to maintain financial flexibility, than these 
firms do not depend so much on internal funds.  
 
According Dang (2013) this analysis based on (5) equation will help to identify the 
difference between financial constraint hypothesis in comparison with underinvestment and 
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financial flexibility hypothesis. This regression could help to explain what effect firm’s 
zero-leverage policy has on its future investment during three periods: before, during and 
after financial crisis.   
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5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
 
5.1 Univariate analysis 
 
 
The firms in the table 5 are categorized by two groups: zero-levered firms and levered 
firms. Additionally, the distribution of zero-leveraged and leveraged firms is presented by 
three different periods. First one, 2003 and 2006 is a period before financial crisis. Second, 
2007 and 2009, present the financial crisis period and the last one, is a period after financial 
crisis, 2010 – 2013. In the parentheses is presented the per cent of zero-leveraged and 
leveraged firms.  
 
Table 5. Number of zero-leverage and leveraged observations by different period 
Variables All period 2003-2006 2007-2009 2010-2013 
Zero-levered 
observations 
3115 
(28.55%) 
1115 
(28.10%) 
832 
(27.96%) 
2799 
(70.54%) 
Levered 
observations 
7797 
(71.45%) 
2854 
(71.90%) 
2144 
(72.04%) 
1169 
(29.46%) 
Whole sample 
10912 
(100%) 
3968 
(100%) 
2976 
(100%) 
3968 
(100%) 
 
It can be seen that most of the observations, nearly three fourths of whole sample are 
levered. The same structure is presented also in the period before financial crisis and during 
the financial crisis. However, during 2010 and 2013 results have changed, firms tend to be 
zero-levered. After financial crisis, almost three fourths of whole sample are zero-levered 
firms.  
 
The results show that there are an increasing number of zero-leveraged firms after financial 
crisis. Therefore, it could be said that financial crisis has impact for firm’s capital structure.  
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Table 6 presents the descriptive statistics for the full sample of firms. The descriptive 
statistics are represented by means, standard deviations, medians, maximums, minimums 
values and the number of observations for the variables.  
 
Table 6. Descriptive statistics of full sample  
Variables 
Full Sample 
Mean S.D. Median Min. Max. N 
Book leverage 0.197 1.137 0.079 0.000 77.757 10912 
Size 5.373 0.822 5.387 0.477 8.316 10912 
Market-to-book 2.902 16.739 1.757 -2.421 1276.31 10912 
Tangibility 0.204 0.204 0.129 0.000 1.000 10912 
Profitability -0.083 2.461 0.057 -207.67 2.362 10912 
Abnormal earnings 0.008 1.008 0.008 -15.52 92.213 9911 
Retained earnings 6.921 508.38 0.008 -7303.06 50096.67 10912 
Asset growth 1.441 117.85 0.061 -0.930 11729.38 9920 
Tobin’s Q 2.902 16.74 1.752 -2.421 1276.31 10912 
Capital expenditures 0.046 0.067 0.027 0.000 2.99 10912 
∆ Property, plant and 
 Equipment 
0.009 0.083 0.002 -3.825 0.952 9920 
R&D 0.110 1.168 0.021 0.000 93.087 10912 
Payout ratio 0.037 0.110 0.001 0.000 5.013 10912 
Equity issuances 0.085 0.424 0.008 -0.024 25.948 10912 
Taxes 0.019 0.053 0.011 -1.091 1.227 10912 
Non-debt tax shield 0.037 0.039 0.028 0.000 1.936 10912 
Cash holdings 0.284 0.252 0.214 0.000 1.000 10912 
Asset risk 0.724 0.969 0.584 -9.980 48.001 10912 
 
Definitions of all variables presented in the fourth chapter, table 4. First, the results in table 
6 are compared with Bessler et al (2013) results. This kind of analysis will help to identify 
possible errors in data. The book-leverage, size, market-to-book, tangibility and 
profitability ratios are lower in this study in comparison with Bessler et al. (2013) findings. 
Moreover the ratios of abnormal earnings and retained earnings in Bessler et al. (2013) 
study are negative and low, however in this study these ratios are positive and the ratio of 
retained earnings is extremely high. Additionally the biggest difference is in asset grow 
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ratios, in Bessler et al. (2013) this ratio is quite how and in this study it is high. It shows 
that firms in this study are small and have higher growth opportunities in comparison with 
firms in Bessler et al. (2013) study. This suggestion is supported by one more finding, the 
ratio of research and development is higher in this study in comparison with Bessler et al. 
(2013). Moreover the companies in this study are riskier, because the ratio of asset risk is 
higher. In this study the abnormal earnings and retained earnings ratios deviate most from 
findings in Bessler et al. (2013) study. However, the higher retained earnings ratio the less 
firm is dependent on equity or debt; therefore this ratio could not be removed from this 
study.  
 
The traditional variables which explain capital structure is size, market-to-book ratio, 
tangibility, and profitability. The average of size is 5.373 and the highest firm’s size is 
8.316. It could be said that firms in this sample are not that big. In addition, mean of book 
leverage of all sample is also low, just 0.197. Therefore, it could be said that on average 
this sample contains small and low-leveraged firms. The market-to-book ratio shows adjust 
firm’s market value to its’ accounting value. The mean of market-to-book ratio is 2.902, 
even though the maximum market-to-book ratio is 1276.31. The low market-to-book ratio 
shows that firms are undervalued and the stock price of these companies are expected to 
rise. The average ratio of tangibility is 0.204 and the mean of profitability is -0.083.  
 
Further some additional variables are examined. Such as asset growth, Tobin’s Q, capital 
expenditures, research and development, payout ratio, equity issuances, taxes, non-debt tax 
shield, cash holdings, asset risk and change of property, plant and equipment. All these 
variables, expect the change of property, plant and equipment, are used in order to explain 
the tendency of zero-leverage firms over time.  
 
In the 7 table is presented a correlation matrix for dependent and independent variables. 
Additionally is analysed the variables in 5 equation. Book leverage appears to have a 
positive and strong relationship with market-to-book, retained earnings, Tobin’s Q, equity 
issuance ratios. There is a strong and negative association with book leverage and 
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profitability. For 5th equation the dependent variable is capital expenditures and 
independent variables are cash flow and Tobin’s Q. All these variables experience low 
correlation. 
 
Table 7. Correlation matrix 
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Book-
leverage 
1,00            
Size -0,06 1,00           
Market to 
book 
0,55 -0,13 1,00          
Tangibility 0,05 0,17 -0,03 1,00         
Profitability -0,92 0,13 -0,56 0,02 1,00        
Abnormal 
earnings 
0,01 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,01 1,00       
Retained 
earnings 
0,46 -0,05 0,01 -0,01 -0,47 0,00 1,00      
Tobin’s Q 0,55 -0,13 0,99 -0,03 -0,56 0,00 0,01 1,00     
Capital 
expenditure
/Investment 
0,05 0,09 -0,00 0,61 -0,01 0,00 0,01 0,00 1,00    
Equity 
issuance 
0,69 -0,23 0,41 -0,07 -0,69 0,00 0,33 0,00 0,00 1,00   
Cash 
holdings 
-0,05 -0,26 0,06 -0,44 -0,05 -0,01 0,02 0,06 -0,21 0,20 1,00  
Cash flow 0,00 -0,03 0,00 -0,05 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 -0,04 0,01 0,10 1,00 
 
Finally, the characteristics of zero-leverage firms with those of levered firms are compared. 
This analysis helps to test if there are statistically significant differences in means between 
two groups, in this case zero-leverage firms and levered firms. This study is based by book 
leverage ratio, based on this ratio is created the dummy variable of zero-levered firms. 
Therefore, from the table 8 is seen that the ratio of book leverage for zero-levered firms is 
equal to zero. This is the main indicator which distributes zero-levered firms from levered 
ones. As it can be seen from the table the difference in means is highly statistically 
significant.  
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Table 8. Difference of means test 
  Zero – levered 
firms 
Levered firms t-statistics 
1 Number of observations 3115 7797  
2 Book leverage 0.000 0.276 -11.508 
3 Size 5.123 5.472 -20.382 
4 Market-to-book 3.283 2.750 1.503 
5 Tangibility 0.131 0.234 -24.360 
6 Profitability -0.056 -0.094 0.741 
7 Abnormal earnings -0.006 0.013 -0.828 
8 Retained earnings 2.863 8.543 -0.527 
9 Asset growth 0.303 1.900 -0.610 
10 Capital expenditure 0.036 0.049 -9.271 
11 R&D 0.127 0.103 0.968 
12 ∆ Property, plant and equipment 0.004 0.011 -3.855 
13 Payout ratio 0.054 0.030 10.179 
14 Equity issuances 0.106 0.077 3.197 
15 Taxes 0.025 0.016 7.868 
16 Tobin’s Q 3.294 2.746 1.546 
17 Non-debt tax shield 0.030 0.039 -11.688 
18 Cash holdings 0.442 0.222 44.876 
19 Cash flow 151.645 46.135 4.045 
20 Asset risk 0.891 0.657 11.434 
21 Previous year’s ZL decision 0.852 0.059 -129.834 
 
The most important finding that the firm’s size ratio is statistically significant, which 
indicates that there is difference between the average firm sizes of zero-levered firms and 
levered firms. However, the average of zero-levered firm is 5.1234 and levered firm is 
5.472. The average size ratios between these two groups are nearly identical.  This finding 
contradicts with Dang (2013) result that zero-levered firms are smaller and younger in 
comparison with levered firms.  
 
It was mentioned before that those classical variables for explaining firm’s capital structure 
are size, market-to-book ratio, tangibility and profitability. The difference of means test 
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shows that there is no difference between market-to-book and profitability of zero-levered 
and levered firms. However, the tangibility ratio is statistical significant, which indicates 
that zero-levered firms have lower asset tangibility in comparison with levered firms.  
 
Zero-levered firms are expected to have lower abnormal earnings compared with levered 
firms. Results in the table x show that the average abnormal earning for zero-levered firms 
is lower than levered firms. However, the results are not statistically significant.  Including 
retained earnings, the difference between the means is not statistical significant. Even 
though, the analysis presents sufficiently high disparity in means. The average of retained 
earnings for zero-levered firm is 2.862733, levered firm is 8.542500. 
 
Asset growth ratio, research and development ratio, and Tobin’s Q are not statistically 
significant, which states that these two groups are not different in means in relation with 
these ratios. However, the average asset growth ratio for zero-levered firms is lower in 
comparison with levered firms. The opposite situation is for Tobin’s Q, the average Tobin’s 
Q is higher for zero-levered firms than levered firms. The mean of research and 
development ratio is approximately equal.  
 
Equity issuances, taxes, cash holdings, cash flow and asset risk ratios are statistically 
significant and the mean of zero-levered firms are higher in comparison with levered firms. 
This indicates that zero levered firms tend to issue more equity, pay higher taxes, have 
more internal funds and there is more uncertainty.  
 
The difference of payout ratio means is statistically significant. Moreover the average 
payout ratio for zero levered firms is higher compared with levered firms. Additionally the 
difference op change of property, plant, and equipment ratio and non-debt tax shield is also 
statistically significant.  
 
57 
 
The mean of previous year’s zero-leverage dummy variable for zero-levered firms is 
statistically different in comparison with levered firms. This implies that zero-levered firms 
consistently choose to follow such extremely conservative debt policy.  
 
In general, the zero-levered firms have a book leverage which is equal to zero, have lower 
tangibility ratio compared with levered firms. The average firm’s size ratio is 
approximately equal between two groups, even though it is statistically significant.  Zero-
levered firms have a lower capital expenditure ratio, change of property, plant and 
equipment ratio, and non-debt tax shield ratio in comparison with levered firms. In 
addition, the payout ratio, equity issuances ratio and taxes ratio is higher for zero-levered 
firms than levered firms.  
 
5.2 Multivariate analysis 
 
 
5.2.1 Logistic regression analysis of zero-levered firms  
 
Table 9 presents the results of logistic regression models. The depended variable is a 
dummy variable of zero-levered firm, which takes the value one if a firm does not have 
debt during time t and 0 otherwise. All independent variables in this analysis are lagged by 
one year. The table 9 is divided into 6 columns, which presents various logistic regression 
models. First column [1] is created by standard capital variables in order to compare results 
with more expanded logistic regression model in second column [2]. In the third model [3] 
previous year zero-levered dummy variable is included. The fourth [4] and fifth [5] models 
represent how financial crisis affected firms decision to follow zero-leverage policy. The 
sixth [6] model, the dummy variable of previous year zero-leverage decision is excluded, in 
order to avoid possible evaluation complications. The number in parenthesis is a t-statistic, 
additionally bold numbers are significant at 5% level and italic numbers are significant at 
10% level.  
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Table 9. Logistic regression  
Independent variable [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6]  
Previous ZL decision   
3.050 
(45.556) 
3.055 
(45.533) 
3.050 
(45.332) 
 
2007-2009 dummy     
-0.114 
(-1,130) 
0.032 
(0,392) 
2010-2013 dummy     
-0.004 
(-0,038) 
0.197 
(2,384) 
Size 
-0.532 
(-16,308) 
-0.634 
(-15,999) 
-0.489 
(-9,998) 
-0.492 
(-10,047) 
-0.489 
(-9,961) 
-0.634 
(-15,947) 
Market-to-book 
0.057 
(6,613) 
0.044 
(4,148) 
0.034 
(2,786) 
0.038 
(2,934) 
0.036 
(2,925) 
0.046 
(4,189) 
Tangibility 
-2.989 
(-18,997) 
-1.552 
(-6,293) 
-0.842 
(-2,957) 
-0.865 
(-3,036) 
-0.900 
(-3,151) 
-1.612 
(-6,496) 
Profitability 
0.605 
(9,040) 
0.908 
(8,090) 
0.871 
(7,653) 
0.896 
(7,845) 
0.887 
(7,759) 
0.901 
(7,804) 
Abnormal earnings  
-0.131 
(-1,593) 
-0.101 
(-1,207) 
-0.093 
(-1,130) 
-0.097 
(-1,154) 
-0.140 
(-1,663) 
Retained earnings  
-0.001 
(-3,633) 
-0.001 
(-1,667) 
-0.001 
(-1,704) 
-0.001 
(-1,693) 
-0.001 
(-3,491) 
Asset growth  
-0.001 
(-0,151) 
-0.007 
(-1,345) 
-0.006 
(-1,298) 
-0.006 
(-1,301) 
-0.000 
(-0,198) 
Capital expenditure  
2.103 
(3,252) 
-0.473 
(-0,591) 
-0.324 
(-0,405) 
-0.203 
(-0,253) 
2.364 
(3,656) 
R&D  
0.348 
(1,902) 
0.221 
(1,077) 
0.182 
(0,882) 
0.192 
(0,936) 
0.308 
(1,646) 
Payout dummy  
0.472 
(7,594) 
0.243 
(3,233) 
0.228 
(3,025) 
0.227 
(2,994) 
0.446 
(7,123) 
Payout ratio  
0.615 
(2,296) 
-0.363 
(-1,426) 
-0.377 
(-1,470) 
-0.350 
(-1,379) 
0.635 
(2,330) 
Equity issuances  
-0.807 
(-5,654) 
-0.212 
(-1,405) 
-0.177 
(-1,172) 
-0.184 
(-1,224) 
-0.812 
(-5,553) 
Taxes  
2.202 
(4,078) 
1.194 
(2,013) 
1.205 
(2,033) 
1.200 
(2,016) 
2.217 
(4,075) 
Non-debt tax shield  
0.233 
(0,206) 
2.398 
(1,894) 
2.369 
(1,877) 
2.372 
(1,869) 
0.376 
(0,331) 
Cash holdings  
3.407 
(26,063) 
2.303 
(14,620) 
2.303 
(14,591) 
2.274 
(14,346) 
3.366 
(25,500) 
GDP growth rate    
-0.053 
(-3,051) 
-0.053 
(-2,579) 
-0.013 
(-0,809) 
Asset risk     
0.074 
(1,976) 
0.173 
(4,434) 
Intercept 
2,299 
(13,195) 
1,162 
(5,409) 
-0,350 
(-1,309) 
-0,249 
(-0,923) 
-0,269 
(-0,949) 
0,979 
(4,257) 
Number of observations 9920 8916 8916 8916 8916 8916 
Pseudo R
2 
(McFadden) 
0,082 0,179 0,414 0,414 0,415 0,183 
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The intercepts vary in various logistic models, it is positive in [1] and [2] models, but 
negative in [3], where previous year dummy variable of zero levered firms is included. 
According Bessler et al. (2013) negative intercepts indicates that zero-levered firms are less 
common than levered firms. Perhaps in this study there is lack of panel data, Bessler et al. 
(2013) have data of 112029 observations.  
 
The positive coefficients of taxes ratio in [2] and [3] columns indicate that firms which pay 
higher taxes are more likely to follow zero-leverage policy. Furthermore, the positive 
coefficient of non-debt tax shields indicates that some firms make a decision to follow zero-
leverage policy, when they achieve tax deductions from non-debt sources. However, the 
non-debt tax shield coefficient is statistically significant at 10% level in [3], [4] and [5] 
columns, where dummy variables of previous year zero-levered firms are included.  
 
The positive coefficient of profitability support pecking order theory that firms rely on 
internal funds. However, the negative coefficient of retained earnings contradicts with 
pecking order theory. The other coefficients analysis is more related with trade-off theory. 
According to the trade-off theory, small firms with higher growth opportunities and low 
tangibility tend to follow zero-leverage policy. The growth opportunities could be 
explained by the market-to-book ratio and research and development expenditures. The 
coefficients of size and tangibility in all columns are low, negative and statistically 
significant. However the market-to-book ratio is positive and is approximately close to 
zero. Ratio of research and development is only statistically significant at 10% significance 
level in column [2] and [6]. The sign of this ratio is positive. In the second and sixth 
columns, it could be seen that the ratio of capital expenditures is high, positive and 
statistically significant at 5% significance level, which indicates that higher investment 
opportunities which were discussed previously have occurred in higher levels of capital 
expenditure.  
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These findings do not support financial flexibility hypothesis, considering that the ratios of 
growth opportunities and cash expenditures are high. However, these results could be 
interpreted that zero-levered firms with growth possibilities avoid debt, which supports 
underinvestment hypothesis. Additionally, the high and statistically significant coefficients 
of cash holdings illustrate that firms tend to avoid underinvestment problems. The 
coefficients of equity issuances are negative and statistically significant, which do not 
support underinvestment hypothesis.   
 
The negative sign of size coefficient support financial constraint hypothesis. That firms 
which follow zero-leverage policies have financial problems and are small. For further 
studies is recommended to imply the age variable, since small and young firms are more 
financial constrained.  
 
A pay-out dummy variable which is presented by the value of 1 if a firm pays dividends or 
repurchases its own shares in a given t year (and 0 otherwise) is positive and significant in 
all columns. The pay-out ratio is positive and significant in the [2] and [6] columns, while 
in the remaining columns it is negative and not statistically significant. The sign of these 
two ratios is positive, that indicates that could be one type of zero-levered firms. However, 
the pay-out ratio’s coefficient should be interpreted carefully and based on the results could 
be two groups of zero-levered firms: constrained and unconstrained. The [5] and [6] 
columns present high and statistically significant asset risk coefficients, which imply that 
zero-levered firms are riskier and therefore should use equity.  
 
In columns [4], [5] and [6] of table 9 are included GDP growth ratio, which is statistically 
significant in the first two columns, where the previous year’s zero-leverage dummy 
variable is included. The GDP growth ratio coefficients are negative and statistically 
significant, which implies that zero-leverage policies are affected by macroeconomic 
conditions.   
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Previous year zero-leverage dummy variable is included in the analysis and in column [3], 
[4] and [5] the results are presented. Dang (2013) in his study includes this variable in order 
to control for the persistency of a zero-leverage policy. The incorporation of this dummy 
variable in the model gives approximately by 20% higher pseudo R-squared. Additionally, 
the correlation between zero-leverage dummy variable and previous year’s zero-leverage 
dummy variable is equal to 0.793459. The results in the table 9 present that this dummy 
variable is positive and statistically significant. This shows that zero-levered firms are 
expected to maintain their decision to follow zero-leverage policy.  
 
The year dummy variables are included in [5] and [6] columns, provide some evidence that 
there is a positive and significant impact of financial crisis. The 2010-2013 year dummy 
coefficients are positive and statistically significant, which implies that firm characteristics 
in the logistic model could not fully explain why firms tend to follow zero-leverage policy 
and the number of zero-levered firms increased after financial crisis.  A Wald-test rejects 
the null hypothesis that all year dummy coefficients equal to zero.  
 
5.2.2 Zero-leverage and investment relationship analysis 
 
This analysis is created based on several reasons, first to distinguish constraint hypothesis 
between underinvestment and financial flexibility hypotheses and secondly examine what is 
a relationship between zero leverage firm and its’ future investment during three different 
periods. Table 10 presents the results from equation (5).  
 
Table 10 presents the analysis which is based by Tobin’s Q model of investment (De Jong 
et al., 2012). The table 10 is divided into four main columns; first one presents the main 
relationship between zero-leverage policy and future investment. The last three columns 
present the different periods around financial crisis. Period 2003-2006 is before financial 
crisis, from 2007 until 2009 is period of financial crisis, and the last one is related with 
period after financial crisis. In parenthesis is presented p-values, additionally bold numbers 
are significant at 5% level and italic numbers are significant at 10% level.  
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Table 10. Investment decision of zero-leverage firms  
Independent variable 
[1] [2] [3] [4] 
Whole 
sample 
2003-2006 2007-2009 2010-2013 
Cash flow*DZL -8.99E-08 
(0.823) 
4.26E-07 
(0.896) 
4.46E-07 
(0.882) 
1.41E-077 
(0.700) 
Cash flow*DL -1.35E-06 
(0.084) 
-1.67E-07 
(0.989) 
9.26E-07 
(0.536) 
-8.47E-08 
(0.926) 
Tobin’s Q*DZL -6.93E-06 
(0.968) 
-0.001 
(0.010) 
0.003 
(0.000) 
0.002 
(0.018) 
Tobin’s Q*DL 0.0001 
(0.009) 
-3.87E-05 
(0.848) 
5.30E-05 
(0.437) 
4.96E-05 
(0.545) 
Number of observations 9826 3930 2945 2951 
Adjusted R-squared 0.622 0.695 0.747 0.844 
F-test (Cash flow*DZL= Cash 
flow*DL) 
2.192 0.002 0.021 0.052 
F-test (Tobin’s Q *DZL= Tobin’s Q 
*DL) 
0.653 3.481 15.204 5.216 
 
Column [1] of the table 10 shows that just growth opportunities (Tobin’s Q) for levered 
firms are positive and statistically significant at 5% significance level. However, the cash 
flow for levered firm is significant at 10% significance level. The difference between cash 
flow coefficients of zero-levered firms and levered firms implies that levered firms rely less 
on their internal funds than zero-levered levered firms. This rejects financial flexibility 
hypothesis, even though not all cash flow coefficients are statistically significant.  The 
Tobin’s Q coefficient for zero-levered firms is smaller in comparison with Tobin’s Q 
coefficient for levered firms. This indicates that zero-levered firms tend to invest in hardly 
any growth opportunities, which supports financial constraint hypothesis. However, the 
Tobin’s Q coefficient for zero-levered firms is not statistically significant.  
 
In columns [2], [3] and [4] is presented the various periods around financial crisis. Only 
one variable is statistically significant through these periods is a Tobin’s Q for zero-levered 
firms. For the first period, before financial crisis Tobin’s Q is negative and statistically 
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significant just for zero-levered firms, this implies that growth opportunities have negative 
impact for future investment of zero-levered firms. Later one, during the financial crisis and 
after financial crisis the Tobin’s Q coefficients for zero-levered firms is positive and 
statistically significant. In comparison with Tobin’s Q coefficient for levered firm during 
financial crisis and after financial crisis, the Tobin’s Q coefficient for zero-levered firm is 
lower. This implies that zero-levered firms invest fewer to growth opportunities, which 
supports financial constraint hypothesis during and after financial crisis.  
 
In sum, the results indicate that firms have financial constraint problems. However, some 
coefficients in this study are not statistically significant, and it is difficult to support or 
reject financial constraints hypothesis. It is recommended for further studies include a 
larger sample of data, and additionally divided this sample into two groups as presented by 
Dang (2013) or Bessler et al. (2013), they present zero-levered firms, which pays dividends 
and repurchases stocks and zero-levered firms which do not.    
64 
 
6. CONCLUSION OF THE STUDY 
 
 
6.1 Conclusion 
 
 
This thesis investigates the zero-leverage phenomenon and its relationship with investment 
in USA by selecting sample from Worldscope database from 2003 to 2013. In the sample 
are 992 firms with a total 10912 firm year observations. The firms are selected from the 
NASDAQ stock market index. Macroeconomic variable is taken from the World Bank 
database.  
 
The main characteristics of zero-levered firms are that these firms pay high taxes and 
achieve tax deduction from non-debt sources. Coefficients from pay-out dummy variable 
and pay-out ratio identify that there is one type of zero-levered firm. However, the 
significance of pay-out ratio is not consistent in various logistic regression models. 
Additionally, the zero-levered firms are riskier and tend to use more equity. And based by 
previous year’s zero-leverage decision dummy variable, these firms are consistent, they 
maintain their decision to follow zero-leverage policies.  
 
This study does not support pecking order theory, based on these findings positive and 
significant coefficients of profitability and negative and significant coefficients of retained 
earnings. It does not show that zero-levered firms rely more on internal funds.  
 
In order to support trade-off theory zero-levered firms should be small, have low tangibility 
and high growth opportunities. Findings in this study show that firms are small and have 
low tangibility; however the results are not so strong for high ratios of growth 
opportunities. Additionally this contradicts with financial flexibility hypothesis. Results 
partly supports underinvestment hypothesis, but negative coefficients of equity issuances 
ratio indicates that underinvestment hypothesis is rejected.  
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During all this analysis the constraint hypothesis is not rejected. The coefficients of size 
ratio supports constraint hypothesis, because zero-levered firms are small.  
 
The analysis about zero-leverage phenomenon around financial crisis show that 
macroeconomic conditions have impact for firms decisions to use zero-levered policies. 
Moreover, the results indicate that traditional firm characteristics are not capable to explain 
zero-leverage phenomenon. This study shows that after financial crisis the number of zero-
levered firms increased.  
 
The analysis between zero-leverage and investment brings the results that firms have 
financial constraint problems. However, some coefficients in this study are not statistically 
significant, and it is difficult to support or reject financial constraint hypothesis. 
 
6.2 Limitations 
 
 
The data for this thesis have been chosen based by NASDAQ stock market index. Not all 
listed firms in USA are included in the sample. For further studies it is recommended to 
include the NYSE stock market index. For panel data studies in is necessary to have a 
larger amount of data for accuracy of the results.  
 
Furthermore, in order to test financial constraint hypothesis the age ratio should be 
included. Some academics identify that most financial constrained firms are small and 
young.  
 
Additionally, the study is related with investment around financial crisis. Investments 
decreased for both leveraged and non-leveraged firms during the crisis. There is a supply 
problem in the market, not demand. One of explanations could be that during this period in 
the market were not that many investments opportunities.  
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6.3 Suggestions for further studies 
 
 
For further studies is recommended to study about investment opportunities based on 
portfolios which is created by zero-levered firms. Additionally various investment 
strategies could be compared with investment in zero-levered firms. Especially it is 
interesting to examine these firms, which are presented in Dang (2013) and Bessler et al. 
(2013) findings, zero-levered firms which pay high taxes, dividends and are profitable.  
 
Additionally, the firm’s capital structure is represented by managers and firm’s owners. The 
behaviour of these people could affect firm’s capital structure choices. For instance, if the 
majority of the managers are conservative, it could be related with conservative debt policy.  
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